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INTRODUCTION

In Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., the Minnesota Supreme
Court decided that an airplane manufacturer’s duty to warn does
not include a duty to provide training. 1 The court also decided that
a manufacturer cannot assume a duty to train when its obligation is
created only by contract. 2
This case note will begin with a brief survey of three areas of
law relevant to the Glorvigen decision: the duty to warn, the
†
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Peter D. Kieselbach is a second year law student at William Mitchell
of Law.
816 N.W.2d 572, 583 (Minn. 2012).
Id. at 584.

224

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

1

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 7

2013]

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO GLORVIGEN

225

economic loss doctrine, and the educational malpractice doctrine. 3
Next, it will provide a summary of the facts, procedural history, and
holding from the case. 4 Finally, it will present an argument that
although the supreme court correctly decided that the duty to warn
does not include the duty to train, the majority erred in its
resolution of the assumed-duty issue. 5 Rather than concluding that
a contract cannot give rise to liability in tort, the court should have
concluded that appellants’ claims were barred by the educational
malpractice doctrine.6 By not resolving the case in this manner, the
court missed an opportunity to officially reject educational
malpractice as a valid cause of action. Instead, the court created a
new precedent that may allow future manufacturers to avoid
liability in tort for personal injury simply on the basis of a contract. 7
II. HISTORY
A. Duty to Warn
In Minnesota, a manufacturer may be liable for harm caused
by a defective product.8 One way that a product can be defective is
if it fails to include adequate warnings and instructions for safe
use. 9 The general purpose underlying this duty to warn is to
provide “incentives for manufacturers to achieve optimal levels of
safety.” 10 Some products are unavoidably dangerous, either because
achieving absolute safety is impossible or because it is cost
prohibitive. 11 A lawnmower, for example, needs sharp blades in
order to perform its function of cutting grass. However, without
3. See infra Parts II.A–C.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See, e.g., Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984); McCormack
v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967). See generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (1998); 20A2 BRENT A. OLSON,
M INNESOTA PRACTICE : BUSINESS LAW DESKBOOK § 33:5 (2012 ed.) (providing a
general survey of product liability law in Minnesota).
9. See 27 M ICHAEL K. STEENSON, J. DAVID PRINCE & SARAH L. BREW, M INNESOTA
PRACTICE : PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 4.1 (2012 ed.). Other categories of product
defects include design defects and manufacturing defects. See generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2.
10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a.
11. See id. (“Many product-related accident costs can be eliminated only by
excessively sacrificing product features that make products useful and desirable.”).
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blades, the product is useless. The duty to warn accomplishes the
dual purpose of minimizing the risk of injury to the consumer
while also preserving the utility and economic viability of the
product. 12
Minnesota’s approach to the duty to warn has evolved over the
last sixty years. 13 Historically, a person injured as a result of a
defective warning could only recover if he or she was in privity of
contract with the manufacturer. 14 This rule, in effect, precluded
anyone except for the direct purchaser from bringing a claim for
failure to warn. 15 Liability was also premised solely on theories of
negligence, breach of contract, and breach of warranty. 16
In 1967 in McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., the Minnesota
Supreme Court shifted course and adopted a strict products
liability framework. 17 The plaintiff in McCormack was a three-yearold child who suffered severe burns after knocking over a vaporizer
filled with boiling water. 18 In the instruction manual, the
manufacturer wrote that the vaporizer was “safe,” “practically
foolproof,” and implied that it “could be left unattended in a
child’s room.” 19 Relying on these instructions, the child’s parents
positioned the device next to the child’s bed. 20 At trial, the
manufacturer asserted that the plaintiff’s failure to warn claim
should be barred because (1) it was not in privity of contract with
the child, 21 and (2) the child’s parents were negligent in causing

12. See id. (“Society benefits most when the right, or optimal, amount of
product safety is achieved.”).
13. The duty to warn was first recognized in Minnesota in Hartmon v. Nat’l
Heater Co., 240 Minn. 264, 60 N.W.2d 804 (1953). The court held that “[w]here a
manufacturer undertakes by printed instructions to advise of the proper method
of using his chattel, he assumes the responsibility of giving accurate and adequate
information with respect thereto, and his failure in this respect may constitute
negligence.” Id. at 271–72, 60 N.W.2d at 810.
14. See 27 STEENSON, PRINCE & BREW, supra note 9, §§ 1.2–.4.
15. See id.
16. See, e.g., Westerberg v. Sch. Dist. No. 792, 276 Minn. 1, 148 N.W.2d 312
(1967); Pietrus v. Watkins Co., 229 Minn. 179, 38 N.W.2d 799 (1949).
17. 278 Minn. 322, 323, 154 N.W.2d 488, 491 (1967). Strict products liability,
as a general rule, holds manufacturers accountable for injuries without proof of
“negligence or intent to harm.” BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY 998 (9th ed. 2009). It is
based on the notion that manufacturers have “an absolute duty to make” safe
products. Id.
18. 278 Minn. at 326–27, 154 N.W.2d at 493.
19. Id. at 325, 154 N.W.2d at 492.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 337, 154 N.W.2d at 499.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 7

2013]

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO GLORVIGEN

227

the accident. 22 In rejecting these arguments, the supreme court
concluded:
[I]n our view, enlarging a manufacturer’s liability to those
injured by its products more adequately meets publicpolicy demands to protect consumers from the inevitable
risks of bodily harm created by mass production and
complex marketing conditions. In a case such as this,
subjecting a manufacturer to liability without proof of
negligence or privity of contract, as the rule intends,
imposes the cost of injury resulting from a defective
product upon the maker, who can both most effectively
reduce or eliminate the hazard to life and health, and
absorb and pass on such costs, instead of upon the
consumer, who possesses neither the skill nor the means
necessary to protect himself adequately from either the
risk of injury or its disastrous consequences. 23
The court’s decision in McCormack corresponded with a concurrent
“national shift [towards] strict liability in tort.” 24
Minnesota’s adherence to strict products liability in failure to
warn cases, however, did not last long. 25 Although courts have
persisted in using strict liability language, in practice, the duty has
been construed according to negligence principles. 26 Courts have
22. Id. at 341, 154 N.W.2d at 501.
23. Id. at 338, 154 N.W.2d at 500.
24. Mike Steenson, The Character of the Minnesota Tort System,
33 WM. M ITCHELL L. REV. 239, 253 (2006).
25. George W. Soule & Jacqueline M. Moen, Failure to Warn in Minnesota, the
New Restatement on Products Liability, and the Application of the Reasonable Care
Standard, 21 WM. M ITCHELL L. REV. 389, 391 (1995) (“After adoption of strict
liability . . . the Minnesota Supreme Court struggled for a time in its definition of
failure-to-warn theory.”); see Steenson, supra note 24, at 254 (commenting that
strict products liability had been “reeled back to a negligence base” by 1984).
26. See Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 926 n.4
(Minn. 1986) (“[T]his court has adopted the position that strict liability for failure
to warn is based upon principles of negligence.”); Soule & Moen, supra note 25,
at 391 (“[I]n the 1980s, Minnesota courts . . . adopted a reasonable care standard
for . . . failure-to-warn cases.”); Mike Steenson, A Comparative Analysis of Minnesota
Products Liability Law and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability,
24 WM. M ITCHELL L. REV. 1, 22 (1998) (“The supreme court has stated that strict
liability principles apply in failure to warn cases and has required claimants to
elect between negligence and strict liability theories. Yet, the court has also stated
that negligence principles apply in strict liability context. As a result, absent any
indication that the court intends to establish real distinctions between negligence
and strict liability in failure to warn cases, the underlying basis of recovery is the
same, regardless of the label.”); J. David Prince, New Developments in the Duty to
Warn: A Recent Minnesota Supreme Court Case Clarified Many Aspects of the Law
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recognized the difficulty of imposing liability without at least some
consideration for factors such as the foreseeability of harm, the
potential severity of the harm, the effectiveness of a warning, and
the cost of including a warning relative to its benefits. 27
Unlike other categories of product defect, there is no objective
warning standard. 28
Presently, the duty to warn in Minnesota is applied as follows: a
manufacturer “has a duty to warn end users of a dangerous product
if it is reasonably foreseeable that an injury could occur in its use.” 29
This “duty to warn includes the duty to give adequate instructions
for the safe use of the product.” 30 Whether or not a duty to warn
exists is a question of law for the court. 31 If a court decides that
there is a duty, a jury must determine if the warning was adequate.32
An adequate warning is one that “(1) attract[s] the attention of
those that the product could harm; (2) explain[s] the mechanism
and mode of injury; and (3) provide[s] instructions on ways to
safely use the product to avoid injury.” 33 Like all other negligence
claims, a plaintiff must also prove causation and damages.
B.

Economic Loss Doctrine

As a general rule, a manufacturer who has breached a contract
duty by selling or distributing a defective product cannot be sued in
tort for pure economic loss. 34 Instead, the aggrieved party must
Governing Product Liability Failure-to-Warn Cases, but May Also Have Provided the Basis
to Argue that the Supplier’s Duty to Warn Has Been Broadened, BENCH & B. M INN.,
Nov. 2004, at 16, 17 (“Negligence and so-called ‘strict liability’ claims in failure-towarn cases have merged in Minnesota law.”).
27. For model Minnesota jury instructions on the failure to warn
incorporating some of these factors, see 4A M ICHAEL K. STEENSON & PETER V.
KNAPP, M INNESOTA PRACTICE : JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES—CIVIL § 75.25
(5th ed. 2009).
28. Cf. Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 1984) (commenting
that in the case of a manufacturing flaw, “an objective standard exists—the flawless
product—by which a jury can measure the alleged defect”).
29. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 274 (Minn. 2004).
30. Id.
31. Germann, 395 N.W.2d at 924; see also Balder v. Haley, 399 N.W.2d 77, 81
(Minn. 1987).
32. Balder, 399 N.W.2d at 81.
33. Gray, 676 N.W.2d at 274.
34. See M INN. STAT. § 604.101, subdiv. 3 (2012) (“A buyer may not bring a
product defect tort claim against a seller for compensatory damages unless a
defect in the goods sold or leased caused harm to the buyer’s tangible personal
property other than the goods or to the buyer’s real property.”); Hapka v. Paquin
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pursue a remedy for breach of contract or breach of warranty. 35
This requirement is called the economic loss doctrine; its purpose
is to “preserve[] the boundary between tort and contract law.” 36
Although the economic loss doctrine has a long and sometimes
perplexing history, it has been widely accepted in Minnesota. 37
A central function of the economic loss doctrine is to promote
certainty in contracting. 38 Certainty is desirable because it allows
parties, particularly businesses, to accurately forecast and plan for
the future. 39 The doctrine fosters certainty by mandating that all
disputes involving economic loss be decided according to the rules
of contract. 40 When parties know what rules will be applied in
advance, they can allocate the risk of loss with knowledge that their

Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 691 (Minn. 1990) (holding that “there is no tort liability
for the damage to the potato crop grown with the defective seed” because “[t]his is
economic loss”), superseded by statute, M INN. STAT. § 604.10(a) (2012), as stated in
Kietzer v. Land O’Lakes, No. C1-01-1334, 2002 WL 233746 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb.
19, 2002). See generally Lloyd F. Smith Co., v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 15
(Minn. 1992) (noting that pure economic loss arises when a product “fails to
function as it should” and includes “consequential damages for repair and loss of
profits resulting from inability to use the defective product during the period of its
replacement or repair”); BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY 589 (9th ed. 2009)
(defining economic loss “in a products-liability suit . . . [as] the cost of repair or
replacement of defective property, as well as commercial loss for the property’s
inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use”).
35. See Walter E. Judge, Jr. & Eric A. Poehlmann, Breach of a Contract or a Tort?
The Economic Loss Rule, FOR DEF., Mar. 2003, at 56 (“Simply stated, the rule
provides that where a plaintiff’s loss is purely economic, tort claims are barred and
the plaintiff is limited to his or her contractual or warranty remedies.”).
36. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 572 N.W.2d 321, 324
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997); see 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. P’ship v. Carey-Can., Inc.,
486 N.W.2d 393, 395–96 (Minn.) (“Tort actions and contract actions protect
different interests. Through a tort action, the duty of certain conduct is imposed
by law and not necessarily by the will or intention of the parties. The duty may be
owed to all those within the range of harm, or to a particular class of people.
On the other hand, contract actions protect the interests in having promises
performed. Contract obligations are imposed because of conduct of the parties
manifesting consent, and are owed only to the specific parties named in the
contract.” (citation omitted)), amended by 492 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1992).
37. For a detailed history of the economic loss doctrine in Minnesota, see
Cortney G. Sylvester, Economic Loss: Commercial Contract Law Lives,
27 WM. M ITCHELL L. REV. 417, 423–37 (2000), and Jacquelyn K. Brunmeier,
Death by Footnote: The Life and Times of Minnesota’s Economic Loss Doctrine,
19 WM. M ITCHELL L. REV. 871 (1993).
38. See Sylvester, supra note 37, at 420 (“The principal policy basis for the
doctrine is maintaining a uniform and predictable body of commercial law.”).
39. See id. at 418.
40. See id. at 420–21.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss1/7

6

Kieselbach: Torts: An Alternative Approach to Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp

230

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1

bargained-for allocation will be “give[n] effect.” 41 This supports
marketplace efficiency.
Tort claims are generally excluded from actions involving
economic loss because they “interfere with enforcement of the
contract terms.” 42 Agreements to limit or disclaim liability for
economic loss, for example, would lose all effect if parties were
nevertheless permitted to sue the breaching party in tort. 43
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which governs commercial
transactions, “would become nothing more than a fallback
position, the residual remedies to which parties and courts resort
when no tort theory quite fits.” 44 The economic loss doctrine thus
safeguards contract terms “by excluding tort remedies from broad
categories of commercial [and consumer] disputes.” 45
The doctrine’s tort bar does not, however, cover claims
involving personal injury. 46 A party injured by a defective product is
permitted to sue the manufacturer in tort, notwithstanding the
contract. This exception, which has been recognized by the
Minnesota Supreme Court and legislature, 47 is based on three
principal public policy considerations.
41. Id. at 423.
42. Id.
43. See Judge & Poehlmann, supra note 35 (“[T]ort law should not be used to
redress grievances relating to whether a product met the performance
expectations of the purchaser.”).
44. Sylvester, supra note 37, at 421. The UCC has specific rules that govern
the time limit to bring a claim, how to give notice of a claim, and what remedies
may be sought. See generally M INN. STAT. § 336.2 (2012). A tort claim would, in
essence, constitute an end-run around these requirements.
45. Sylvester, supra note 37, at 421.
46. See Ralph A. Anzivino, The False Dilemma of the Economic Loss Doctrine,
93 M ARQ. L. REV. 1121, 1121 (2010) (commenting that a manufacturer can be
sued in tort if its “defective product causes personal injury”).
47. M INN. STAT. § 604.101, subdiv. 2 (providing that the economic loss
doctrine “does not apply to claims for injury to the person”); 80 S. Eighth St. L.P.
v. Carey-Can., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn.) (“[E]conomic losses that arise
out of commercial transactions, except those involving personal injury . . . are not
recoverable under the tort theories of negligence or strict products liability.”
(quoting Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 162
(Minn. 1981))), amended by 492 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1992); Hapka v. Paquin Farms,
458 N.W.2d 683, 688 (“[T]here is reason . . . to preserve tort remedies for personal
injuries arising out of commercial transactions, as well as those arising out of
consumer transactions . . . .”); see also D & A Dev. Co. v. Butler, 357 N.W.2d
156, 159 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Minneapolis Soc’y of Fine Arts v. ParkerKlein Assocs. Architects, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 816, 819–20 (Minn. 1984)) (noting that
the economic loss doctrine in “Minnesota does allow the recovery of economic
damages when they accompany personal injury”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
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First, courts and legislatures have determined that “[s]ocial
interests in health and safety may outweigh the commercial
interests” of certainty and predictability. 48 When a consumer
purchases a product in the market, it may be fair to hold that he or
she has assumed the risk of economic loss; however, “[a] consumer
should not be charged at the will of the manufacturer with bearing
the risk of physical injury.” 49 If manufacturers could contractually
disclaim liability for physical injuries without any possibility of
liability in tort, the marketplace would be flooded with dangerous
products. Holding manufacturers accountable for physical injuries
provides a substantial incentive for the creation of products that
are reasonably safe. 50 Manufacturers are in the best position to
assume this burden because they control product design, the
PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. c (1998); Brunmeier, supra note 37, at 872 (“The economic
loss doctrine generally permits recovery only in contract for ‘economic losses’
arising from defective products, while both contract and tort recovery are available
for ‘noneconomic losses.’”).
48. Sylvester, supra note 37, at 422; see also Lloyd F. Smith Co., v. Den-Tal-Ez,
Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 16 (Minn. 1992) (“[W]hen the defective product causes
personal injury, an injury which may occur many years after the sale, the law’s
concern for compensating personal injury outweighs the commercial need for a
relatively short limitation period and traditional tort remedies are permitted.”);
Superwood Corp., 311 N.W.2d at 162 (“Limiting the application of strict products
liability to consumers’ actions or actions involving personal injury will allow the
UCC to satisfy the needs of the commercial sector and still protect the legitimate
expectations of consumers.”), overruled by Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 688 (Minn. 1990);
Mike Steenson, The Character of the Minnesota Tort System, 33 WM. M ITCHELL
L. REV. 239, 255–56 (2006) (“The economic loss doctrine . . . balances two
conflicting societal goals. One encourages marketplace efficiency through the
voluntary allocation of economic risks, and the other discourages conduct that
leads to physical harm.” (footnotes omitted)).
49. Sylvester, supra note 37, at 420 (quoting Seely v. White Motor Co.,
403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965)). As California Supreme Court Justice Traynor wrote
in his oft-cited concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno:
[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will
most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in
defective products that reach the market. It is evident that the
manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against the
recurrence of others, as the public cannot. Those who suffer injury
from defective products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The
cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one,
for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and
distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.
150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 1944).
50. Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 328,
188 N.W.2d 426, 431 (1971) (“[M]aximum legal protection should be afforded
the consumer to promote product safety . . . .”).
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manufacturing process, warnings, and instructions, and they can
pass the cost on to consumers. 51 Without the personal injury
exception to the economic loss doctrine, the risk of injury and all
associated burdens would be placed solely on the shoulders of
individual consumers.
A second policy consideration is that consumers often lack
bargaining power relative to manufacturers. The reason for this
disparity is twofold. First, manufacturers have greater financial
resources than individual consumers. Second, most products are
delivered to the marketplace in take-it or leave-it form. Consumers
“have little opportunity to inspect a product for potential hazards”52
or to make suggestions for improvements to the manufacturer. 53
Because of this, consumers are generally unable to “protect
themselves by contractually shifting the risk of loss.” 54 The personal
injury exception levels the playing field by automatically allocating
liability onto manufacturers.
A third and final policy consideration underlying the
exception is that contract damages are usually inappropriate for
claims involving personal injury. 55 Under the rules of tort, a
plaintiff can liberally recover consequential damages, 56 damages for
mental suffering and emotional distress, 57 and punitive damages. 58
51. Id. (“[T]he burden of loss caused by placing a defective product on the
market should be borne by the manufacturer, who is best able to distribute it by
insuring against inevitable hazards as a part of the cost of the product . . . .”);
Duxbury v. Spex Feeds, Inc., 681 N.W.2d 380, 387 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004)
(commenting that it is appropriate to “impose the costs of defective products
upon the maker, who presumably profits from the product” (quoting In re
Shigellosis Litig., 647 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002))).
52. Sylvester, supra note 37, at 422.
53. Id. (commenting that if a consumer noticed something that “he or she
thought would make the product safer, the manufacturer would be unlikely to
respond”).
54. Id.; see also Lee, 290 Minn. at 327–28, 188 N.W.2d at 431 (“The public
interest in safety will be promoted by discouraging the marketing of defective
products which constitute a menace to consumers not equipped to protect
themselves from products they are induced to purchase through modern
advertising methods by persuasive representations that the product is suitable and
safe for its intended use.”).
55. See Michael Dorff, Attaching Tort Claims to Contract Actions: An Economic
Analysis of Contort, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 390, 398–401 (1997).
56. Id. at 398 (“Tort victims are generally denied consequential damages only
if ‘there was nothing in the situation to suggest to the most cautious mind’ that the
consequence would occur.” (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99,
101 (N.Y. 1928))).
57. See Dornfeld v. Oberg, 503 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Minn. 1993) (“Minnesota
has allowed recovery for injuries resulting from fear for one’s own safety.”).
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Contract damages, on the other hand, are significantly more
limited. 59 Consequential damages for breach of contract are only
awarded if they were reasonably “in contemplation of both parties,
at the time they made the contract, as a probable result of the
breach of it.” 60 This is a very high standard. 61 Furthermore, damages
for mental suffering and emotional distress are almost never
permitted “except in exceptional cases where the breach [of the
contract] is accompanied by an independent tort.” 62 Punitive
damages, meanwhile, are similarly almost never permitted. 63 If the
economic loss doctrine barred tort claims for contract breaches
that resulted in personal injury, injured parties would consistently
be deprived of adequate compensation.
In summary, the economic loss doctrine prohibits tort claims
when the breach of a contract results in pure economic loss.
For public policy reasons, however, the doctrine’s tort prohibition
has not been interpreted to extend to claims involving personal
injury.
C.

Educational Malpractice Doctrine

The educational malpractice doctrine, as a matter of law, bars
“claims that attack the general quality of education provided to
students.” 64 Although a teacher or school may be liable for
58. See M INN. STAT. § 549.20 (2012) (outlining when punitive damages are
permitted in civil actions).
59. Dorff, supra note 55, at 398 (“[T]he foreseeability rule is applied more
loosely in tort than in contract.”).
60. Id. (quoting Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch.)).
61. Cf. id. at 406 (“[T]he foreseeability test is applied more loosely in tort
than in contract. In tort, the foreseeability test is applied from the time of the
injury, looking backwards. In contract, the focus is on the time the agreement was
made; defendants are only liable for consequential damages within the
contemplation of the parties at the time of contract formation. Because the focus
in tort is closer in time, consequential damages are generally more foreseeable
than in contract cases.”).
62. Deli v. Univ. of Minn., 578 N.W.2d 779, 782 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998);
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981).
63. See Jacobs v. Farmland Mut. Ins. Co., 377 N.W.2d 441, 445 (Minn. 1985)
(“Even if a contract is breached maliciously, punitive damages will not lie unless
the maliciousness constitutes an independent tort.”); Barr/Nelson, Inc. v. Tonto’s,
Inc., 336 N.W.2d 46, 52 (Minn. 1983) (holding that punitive damages are not
allowed except “where the breach is accompanied by an independent tort”).
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981).
64. Alsides v. Brown Inst., Ltd., 592 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
See generally DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 333 (2d ed. 2011) (providing a general survey of the educational
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negligent supervision, 65 or for maintaining defective premises or
equipment, 66 the educational malpractice doctrine provides that
there is no commensurate liability for failing to effectively
educate. 67
Educational malpractice was first tested, and rejected, as a
cause of action in 1976 in Peter W. v. San Francisco United School
District. 68 In this seminal case, a recent high school graduate sued
his local school district alleging that the district’s negligence caused
him to fall short of basic academic benchmarks in reading and
writing. 69 The California Court of Appeals dismissed the plaintiff’s
claim, concluding that “the failure of educational achievement may
not be characterized as an ‘injury’ within the meaning of tort law.”70
The court reached this conclusion on two grounds. First, the court
pointed out that there is “no readily acceptable standard[] of care”
for an educator because of the wide, and often conflicting, range of
viewpoints on pedagogy and teaching methodology. 71 Second, the
court noted that there are too many factors “outside the formal
teaching process, and beyond the control of its ministers” that
affect a student’s academic achievement, making causation tenuous
at best. 72
In the wake of Peter W., the educational malpractice doctrine
was adopted by many other jurisdictions nationwide. 73 In the
malpractice doctrine).
65. E.g., Sheehan v. St. Peter’s Catholic Sch., 291 Minn. 1, 2, 188 N.W.2d 868,
869 (1971).
66. E.g., Tiemann v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 740, 331 N.W.2d 250, 251
(Minn. 1983); Kingsley v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 312 Minn. 572, 574, 251 N.W.2d
634, 635 (1977).
67. There are three basic types of educational malpractice claims: “(1) the
student alleges that the school negligently failed to provide him with adequate
skills; (2) the student alleges that the school negligently diagnosed or failed to
diagnose his learning or mental disabilities; or (3) the student alleges that the
school negligently supervised his training.” Dall. Airmotive, Inc. v. FlightSafety
Int’l, Inc., 277 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Moore v. Vanderloo,
386 N.W.2d 108, 113 (Iowa 1986)).
68. 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Ct. App. 1976).
69. Id. at 856.
70. Id. at 862.
71. Id. at 860.
72. Id. at 861.
73. See, e.g., Christensen v. S. Normal Sch., 790 So. 2d 252, 254–55
(Ala. 2001) (“Alabama does not recognize a cause of action for educational
malpractice.”); Page v. Klein Tools, Inc., 610 N.W.2d 900, 906 (Mich. 2000)
(“[C]laims alleging negligent instruction, whether those claims are brought
against public schools, institutions of higher learning, or private proprietary and
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beginning, the rule was applied primarily to “traditional classroom
schools.” 74 Over time, however, it was extended to include “other
educational experiences, like residency training for physicians and
surgeons or trade or technical schools.” 75 Presently, nearly all
jurisdictions that have “considered the issue[] [have] found that
educational malpractice claims are not cognizable.” 76
In Minnesota, educational malpractice was first considered in
1999 in Alsides v. Brown Institute, Ltd. 77 There, a group of students
sued Brown Institute, a for-profit trade school, alleging, among
other things, that courses were ineffectively taught. 78 In rejecting
the plaintiffs’ claim, the court of appeals cited precedent from
other jurisdictions and concluded that educational malpractice is
not a viable cause of action. 79 The court focused on public policy
arguments, noting that it would be too difficult to establish an
acceptable “standard of care by which to evaluate an educator” and
to prove causation. 80 Furthermore, recognition of educational
malpractice would “embroil the courts into overseeing the day-today operations of schools” and expose educators to a “flood of
litigation.” 81 Since Alsides, Minnesota courts have continued to
recognize and apply the educational malpractice doctrine. 82
However, it has never been expressly considered by the supreme
court.

trade schools, are not cognizable in Michigan.”); Andre v. Pace Univ., 655 N.Y.S.2d
777, 779 (App. Term 1996) (“[T]he courts of this State have consistently declined
to entertain actions sounding in ‘educational malpractice.’”); Lawrence v. Lorain
Cnty. Cmty. Coll., 713 N.E.2d 478, 480 (Ohio 1998) (“Ohio does not recognize
educational malpractice claims for public policy reasons.”).
74. DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 64, § 333.
75. Id.
76. Dall. Airmotive, Inc. v. FlightSafety Int’l, Inc., 277 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2008). But see B.M. by Burger v. State, 649 P.2d 425, 427 (Mont. 1982)
(“The school authorities owed [a] child a duty of reasonable care in testing her
and placing her in an appropriate special education program.”).
77. 592 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (“The question of whether
courts should recognize a claim for educational malpractice is one of first
impression in Minnesota.”).
78. Id. at 470–71.
79. Id. at 473.
80. Id. at 472.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Zinter v. Univ. of Minn., 799 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011);
Clem v. St. Mary’s Univ. of Minn., No. A09-1231, 2010 WL 773596 (Minn. Ct. App.
Mar. 9, 2010); Smith v. Argosy Educ. Grp., Inc., No. A08-0222, 2008 WL 4977598
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2008).
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III. THE GLORVIGEN V. CIRRUS DESIGN CORP. DECISION
A. Facts and Procedure
On January 18, 2003, Gary R. Prokop and James Kosak were
killed in an airplane crash. 83 Mr. Prokop was piloting an SR22,
which he had purchased from Cirrus—the manufacturer—in
December 2002. 84 As a part of the purchase price, Cirrus
committed to provide Mr. Prokop with transition training to help
him become familiar with the airplane. 85 Providing training to a
new owner is a standard practice within the general aviation
industry. 86 Cirrus contracted with the University of North Dakota
Aerospace Foundation (UNDAF) to run the program. 87
Mr. Prokop began transition training on December 9, 2002. 88
The program consisted of corresponding ground and in-flight
lessons. 89 The UNDAF training instructor was required to complete
a syllabus assessing Mr. Prokop’s mastery of all lessons taught. 90 A
key part of the training was Flight Lesson 4a, which involved an
emergency maneuver known as “Recovery from VFR 91 into IMC 92
(auto-pilot assisted).” 93 This maneuver allows a pilot, with the help
of the autopilot function, to recover safely after inadvertently flying
into an area of low visibility. 94 Flight Lesson 4a was particularly
important to Mr. Prokop because he was only licensed to fly in
high-visibility conditions, 95 and he did not have prior experience
using an autopilot function. 96

83. Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 579 (Minn. 2012).
84. Id. at 575.
85. Id. at 576.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 578.
89. Id. at 576–77.
90. Id. at 578.
91. VFR stands for “visual flight rule.” Id. at 577. “VFR conditions are weather
conditions in which visibility is three miles or greater and the pilot is able to see
the ground.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. IMC stands for “instrument meteorological conditions.” Id. “In IMC, a
pilot is deprived of visual ground references and must rely on instruments to fly
the airplane.” Id.
93. Id. at 577–78.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 577.
96. Id. at 575–76. Mr. Prokop’s previous airplane was a 1968 Cessna 172 Sky
Hawk. Id. at 575.
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Although Mr. Prokop completed the training program, he
never received the in-flight portion of Flight Lesson 4a as
promised. 97 According to the syllabus, this part of the lesson was
omitted. 98 Mr. Prokop’s only exposure to the emergency maneuver
came from a PowerPoint presentation that he watched during a
ground lesson and from several written training manuals provided
by Cirrus. 99 He never had the opportunity to practice the maneuver
in the air.
Several weeks later, on January 18, 2003, Mr. Prokop and
passenger Mr. Kosak embarked on a flight from Grand Rapids to
St. Cloud. 100 Shortly after departing, they experienced turbulence.101
As Mr. Prokop attempted to deal with the turbulence, the airplane
entered low-visibility conditions. 102 This resulted in an emergency
situation identical to the one that was supposed to be covered in
Flight Lesson 4a. 103 Mr. Prokop, for reasons unknown, failed to
engage the autopilot and did not attempt to perform the Recovery
from VFR into IMC maneuver. 104 Shortly thereafter, the airplane
entered into an accelerated stall and crashed into the ground. 105
Both Mr. Prokop and Mr. Kosak were killed on impact. 106
After the accident, Thomas Gartland, as trustee for the next of
kin of Mr. Prokop, and Rick Glorvigen, as trustee for the next of
kin of Mr. Kosak, commenced negligence actions against Cirrus. 107
The plaintiffs alleged that Cirrus breached its duty to warn by
failing to provide adequate training. 108 Specifically, the plaintiffs
argued that if Mr. Prokop had received the promised in-flight

97. Id. at 578.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 577.
100. Id. at 578.
101. Id. at 579.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 578–79.
104. See id. at 579.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Complaint, Gartland v. Cirrus Design Corp., No. 31-CV-05-3673 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. Sept. 13, 2005), 2005 WL 6309346 [hereinafter Gartland Complaint];
Complaint, Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., No. 31-CV-05-3673 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
July 28, 2005), 2005 WL 6309684 [hereinafter Glorvigen Complaint]. The district
court combined the two cases. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 575. UNDAF intervened as
a party after Cirrus sought indemnity. Id. at 580.
108. Gartland Complaint, supra note 107, ¶ 5; Glorvigen Complaint, supra
note 107, ¶¶ 18–20.
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training, he would have engaged the autopilot, performed the
Recovery from VFR into IMC maneuver, and stabilized the
aircraft. 109 Because the crash was a foreseeable result of this
deficient training, Cirrus had a duty to provide the omitted in-flight
lesson. 110
After weighing the evidence, the trial court ultimately found in
favor of the plaintiffs and awarded nearly $20,000,000 in
damages. 111 Cirrus and UNDAF appealed 112 and a divided court of
appeals overturned the verdict.113 The court concluded that Cirrus’s
duty to warn “did not include the provision of transition
training.” 114 Citing Alsides, 115 the court also concluded that Cirrus
did not voluntarily assume a duty to train when it offered transition
training because “Minnesota does not recognize the duty to
effectively educate.” 116 Such a claim, the court noted, is “barred
under the educational-malpractice doctrine.” 117 Mr. Glorvigen and
Mr. Gartland appealed and the Minnesota Supreme Court granted
review. 118
B.

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Holding

In 2012, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of the court of appeals, but utilized different reasoning. 119 The
court echoed the lower court in holding that the duty to warn does
not include a duty to train. 120 The supreme court reasoned that the
imposition of a duty to train would extend the duty to warn to
unacceptable lengths, representing “an unprecedented expansion
of the law.” 121 The majority wrote: “While we agree that
foreseeability guides our determination of whether a duty to warn

109. See Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 578.
110. Gartland Complaint, supra note 107, ¶ 5; Glorvigen Complaint, supra
note 107, ¶¶ 9–10, 17.
111. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 580.
112. Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 796 N.W.2d 541, 543 (Minn. Ct. App.
2011), aff’d, 816 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 2012).
113. Id. at 558.
114. Id. at 552.
115. Alsides v. Brown Inst., Ltd., 592 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
116. Glorvigen, 796 N.W.2d at 556.
117. Id.
118. Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 580 (Minn. 2012).
119. Id. at 584.
120. Id. at 583.
121. Id.
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exists, we do not agree that foreseeability leads to a conclusion that
Cirrus’s duty to warn included an obligation to provide training.” 122
In deciding whether or not Cirrus voluntarily assumed a duty
to train, however, the court declined to consider the educational
malpractice doctrine. 123 Instead, the court indirectly invoked the
economic loss doctrine and concluded that “[w]hen a contract
provides the only source of duties between the parties, Minnesota
law does not permit the breach of those duties to support a cause
of action in negligence.”124 In other words, the breach of a contract
duty alone cannot give rise to liability in tort. Under this
framework, the court reasoned that Cirrus did not assume a duty to
train because its obligation was created only by the purchase
agreement. 125
The court’s decision in Glorvigen was not unanimous. The
dissent, penned by Justice Paul Anderson and joined by Justice
Page, rejected both portions of the majority’s holding. The dissent
first argued that the question of training should be left to a jury. 126
In other words, a jury should determine, as a matter of adequacy,
whether a written warning was sufficient or whether additional
training was required. 127 Second, the dissent argued that the
purchase agreement should not have shielded Cirrus from
assuming a duty to train. 128 To justify this position, the dissent noted
that the appellants’ claims fit squarely within the personal injury
exception to the economic loss doctrine. 129
Overall, the dissent cautioned that the court’s decision and
reasoning would have “far-reaching consequences.” 130 As Justice
Anderson explained:
By holding that a supplier of a dangerous product . . . is
never required to provide anything beyond written
122. Id.
123. Id. at 584.
124. Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 853 F.2d 619, 622 (8th Cir. 1988)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 585–87 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
127. Id. The dissent pointed out that “[t]he jury’s determination will vary
from case to case, based on the facts of the case and the type of product the
supplier provides.” Id. at 586.
128. Id. at 587.
129. See id. at 589 (“While we have rightly limited tort liability when the
relationship of the parties is governed purely by contract, we have never
foreclosed—indeed, we have specifically accommodated—tort liability when
personal injury or non-economic-loss damages are asserted.”).
130. Id.
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instructions—even if the supplier has promised to provide
nonwritten instructions—the majority has essentially held
that no consumer of a dangerous product may ever hold a
supplier liable for personal injury arising out of defective
nonwritten instructions. 131
IV. ANALYSIS
The Minnesota Supreme Court reached the right conclusion
in Glorvigen, but its approach was inconsistent. The majority
correctly decided (1) that the duty to warn does not include the
duty to train, 132 and (2) that Cirrus did not voluntarily assume a
duty to train. 133 However, in addressing the assumed-duty issue, the
court erred by holding—in essence—that the breach of the
contract could not lead to liability in tort. 134 This holding was
unnecessary and does not comport with Minnesota precedent
regarding the economic loss doctrine. 135 To avoid this outcome, the
court should have adopted the reasoning of the court of appeals
and applied the educational malpractice doctrine.
A. Rejection of a Duty to Train: The Right Result
The court’s decision to reject an independent duty to train was
proper and is consistent with holdings from other jurisdictions. 136
131. Id.
132. See infra Part IV.A.
133. See infra Part IV.B.
134. See infra Part IV.B.
135. See infra Part IV.B.
136. See Woodhouse v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. L.L.C., No. EP-11-CV-113-PRM,
2011 WL 3666595, at *3 (W.D. Tex. June 23, 2011) (stating that a prescription
drug manufacturer had no duty to train a prescribing doctor); Adeyinka v. Yankee
Fiber Control, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 265, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that no duty
to train “appears to exist under New York law”); Lemon v. Anonymous Physician,
No. 1:04CV2083LJMWTL, 2005 WL 2218359, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 12, 2005)
(“A medical device manufacturer does not automatically have a duty to properly
train . . . a physician on the surgical implantation and use of the device.”);
York v. Union Carbide Corp., 586 N.E.2d 861, 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that there is “no authority for the proposition that a manufacturer has a legal duty
to train the employees of its buyers”); Chamian v. Sharplan Lasers, Inc.,
No. 200000171, 2004 WL 2341569, at *7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 2004) (holding
that a medical device manufacturer, “[b]y providing training . . . did not become a
guarantor of . . . competence”). See generally Jennifer A. Eppensteiner & Regina M.
Nelson, “Failure to Train” and Medical Device Misuse Claims, FOR DEF., Apr. 2013,
at 31, 31–34 (discussing recent cases involving medical device and prescription
drug manufacturers where the duty to train has been rejected).
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As the supreme court noted, appellants did not cite any “case—
from any court—in which the supplier or manufacturer was
obligated to provide training in order to discharge its duty to
warn.” 137 In fact, acceptance of the appellants’ claims would require
either the creation of “a new common law duty to train or [an]
expan[sion of] the duty to warn to include training.” 138 For the
reasons discussed below, these are not desirable options.
Imposing a duty to train would place an undue burden on
manufacturers, both in terms of cost and exposure to liability.
Manufacturers already have a duty to warn of reasonably
foreseeable dangers. 139 A supplemental duty to train could, in some
instances, make manufacturers both guarantors of absolute
product safety and insurers for injured consumers. 140 This would
not be a just result. Manufacturers cannot be solely responsible for
user competency. Some of this burden should fall upon the
consumer, who ultimately chooses whether or not to purchase a
dangerous product. 141
A duty to train would also have a negative impact on the
marketplace. Manufacturers may elect not to produce important
but dangerous products, to the detriment of society. 142 The cost of
providing training and litigating claims would be passed to
consumers, resulting in higher prices. 143 Manufacturers may decide

137. Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 583 (Minn. 2012).
138. Id.
139. E.g., Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 274 (Minn. 2004).
140. See Brief and Addendum of Respondent Cirrus Design Corp. at 35,
Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d 572 (Nos. A10-1242, -1243, -1246, -1247), 2011 WL 9518487
(“Because the nature of flying means that almost any task a pilot undertakes could
‘foreseeably’ cause a crash if improperly performed, the duty Plaintiffs urge here
would effectively make an aircraft manufacturer the guarantor of the overall
competence of any pilot who buys its plane.”); Brief and Appendix of Amicus
Curiae
Product
Liability Advisory Council, Inc. at 7, Glorvigen,
816 N.W.2d 572 (Nos. A10-1242, -1243, -1246, -1247), 2011 WL 9518489 (arguing
that a duty to train would unreasonably require manufacturers to “insure not only
that consumers are warned about product dangers and provided instructions
regarding safe product use, but also insure through supplemental training that
consumers implement these warnings and instructions in an applied setting”).
141. See Brief and Appendix of Amicus Curiae Product Liability Advisory
Council, Inc., supra note 140, at 8 (“There is a line between the duty to
warn/provide instructions and the duty to learn. The former duty rests with the
product manufacturer or seller. The latter duty belongs to the product user.”).
142. Id. at 16.
143. Id. at 17.
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to stop selling their products in Minnesota to avoid potential
liability and the burden of providing training. 144
If a consumer, after being warned and instructed on how to
safely use a product, continues to desire actual training, he or she
should be permitted to bargain with the manufacturer to receive
this training. But, training should not be imposed as a blanket tort
duty. A blanket duty would interfere with the freedom to contract,
as not all consumers will want training. 145 If a duty to train is ever
imposed, it should be industry specific and it should be regulated
by the legislature or administrative agencies. Courts and juries
simply do not have the necessary experience, expertise, or
authority to determine when training is needed or whether training
is effective. 146 Instead, manufacturers, consumers, agencies, and
lawmakers should be afforded the opportunity to work together to
develop training protocols that are sensible and equitable. 147
The strongest, although still failing, argument in favor of a
duty to train is that the provision of training should be a question
of adequacy for a jury. 148 As Justice Anderson explained in his
dissent, “once the state district court determined that Cirrus owed a
duty to warn, it was up to the jury—not the court, and certainly not
our court—to determine whether Cirrus provided an adequate

144. Id.
145. It is a well-established rule that if a manufacturer offers an optional safety
device and a consumer declines to purchase it, the manufacturer is not relieved of
liability for subsequent injuries. See Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 624–25
(Minn. 1984). This rule is based on the principle that a manufacturer cannot
“delegate its duty to design a reasonably safe product.” Id. at 624. Because product
safety is a non-delegable duty, it stands to reason that manufacturers would be
prohibited from delegating training options to consumers. The consequence of
this is that consumers would likely lose the ability to make their own choices
regarding training.
146. It is fundamental that the power to create laws and regulations resides
solely with the legislative branch. See Smith v. Holm, 220 Minn. 486, 489,
19 N.W.2d 914, 915 (1945) (“[T]he initiative in legislation lies entirely in the
legislature . . . .”).
147. This type of cooperation already occurs within the aviation industry. The
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), for example, has enacted specific rules
governing individual pilot and flight school certification. See 14 C.F.R. § 61 (2013).
The FAA has also established specific airplane manufacturing standards.
See id. § 23.
148. Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 587 (Minn. 2012)
(Anderson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority mistook whether Cirrus owed a duty to
warn, which was for court resolution, for the question [of] whether Cirrus
adequately discharged its duty to warn, which was for jury resolution.”).
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warning or whether Cirrus breached its duty to warn.” 149 This line
of reasoning, however, does not align with Minnesota precedent.
First, making training a jury question would implicate many of
the concerns associated with the educational malpractice
doctrine. 150 Second, the Minnesota Supreme Court has succinctly
defined what constitutes a legally adequate warning, 151 and Cirrus
met this threshold by providing written instructions that
(1) attracted Mr. Prokop’s attention, (2) detailed the risks of
inadvertently entering into IMC, and (3) explained how to recover
using the autopilot. 152 Because legal adequacy was achieved short of
providing training, there was no basis to conclude that Cirrus had a
duty to train. 153
Overall, the court’s decision to reject an independent duty to
train was the correct one. Enlarging the duty to warn to include
training would place too great of a burden on manufacturers.
This would hamper economic activity in Minnesota and interfere
with the freedom to contract. Furthermore, a duty to train would
place the court system into a supervisory role that is best occupied
by legislatures and agencies. The duty to warn is an appropriate
middle ground that protects both manufacturers and consumers.
There is no compelling reason to disturb this balance.
B.

Rejection of an Assumed Duty to Train: The Right Outcome but an
Inconsistent Approach

The Glorvigen court was also correct to conclude that Cirrus
did not assume a duty to train by undertaking to provide transition
training. Ordinarily, it should be noted, a party can assume a duty
149. Id. at 585.
150. For example, how can a jury be tasked with assessing training if there is
no duty to effectively educate? What is the appropriate standard of care for a flight
school? How does a party prove causation?
151. See supra text accompanying note 33.
152. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 583.
153. See id. There is a counterargument to be made that the court’s reasoning
is circular. The court created the standard for evaluating a warning’s adequacy
and is now using this standard to justify its present rejection of a duty to train.
Although this counterargument is true in part, it does not undermine the court’s
decision. One of the supreme court’s main roles is to “help develop, clarify or
harmonize the law.” M INN. R. CIV. APP. P. 117, subdiv. 2(d). The court
accomplished this purpose when it determined what constitutes a legally adequate
warning. The criteria have helped lower courts adjudicate failure to warn claims
with greater consistency and uniformity. Here, the Glorvigen court simply adhered
to its own precedent, which it was justified in creating.
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of reasonable care by voluntarily undertaking to act. 154 However,
the impact of holding that a manufacturer can assume a duty to
train would have unacceptable consequences for society. On policy
grounds alone, the court’s decision was the right one.
Training is often provided to consumers in a wide range of
industries, either for free or as a part of the purchase price of a
product. It is offered to create good will and to promote product
safety. Very often, it achieves both of these ends. 155 Nonetheless, if
providing training constituted an assumption of duty in tort, most
manufacturers would likely stop offering training altogether. The
risk of liability would have a chilling effect. Illogically,
manufacturers that continued to offer training would be penalized
for their socially responsible behavior. Without available training,
public health and safety would suffer. A doctor, for obvious
reasons, should not be expected to learn how to use a new medical
device simply by reading an instruction manual. Based on such an
example, it is clear that the law should encourage, not discourage,
the provision of voluntary training.
The court’s approach to rejecting an assumed duty to train,
however, was inconsistent at best. While the economic loss doctrine
clearly prohibits tort claims for pure economic loss, it has never
been interpreted to extend to cases that, as here, involve personal
injury. 156 The justification for this distinction, as discussed earlier, is
that manufacturers have a stand-alone duty, irrespective of any
contract, to avoid conduct that may cause physical injury. 157 This
duty, which is a foundation of products liability law, is based on the
principle that public health and safety prevail over contractual
interests of uniformity and marketplace efficiency, particularly
154. See Isler v. Burman, 305 Minn. 288, 295, 232 N.W.2d 818, 822 (1975)
(“It is well established that one who voluntarily assumes a duty must exercise
reasonable care or he will be responsible for damages resulting from his failure to
do so.”).
155. Harley-Davidson, for example, offers its customers the opportunity to
enroll in a “Rider’s Edge” training course. For a description of this course and all
other Harley-Davidson training programs, see Learn to Ride, HARLEY-DAVIDSON,
http://www.harley-davidson.com/en_US/Content/Pages/learn-to-ride/learn-to
-ride.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2013).
156. See supra notes 46–63 and accompanying text.
157. Cf. 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. P’ship v. Carey-Can., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393, 396
(Minn.) (“The economic loss doctrine provides a balance between two conflicting
societal goals: that of encouraging marketplace efficiency through the voluntary
contractual allocation of economic risks with that of discouraging conduct that
leads to physical harm.”), amended by 492 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1992).
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when there is a disparity of bargaining power between the parties.158
It is also founded on the notion that “contract damages are
generally inadequate and ill-suited for personal injury claims.” 159
The majority seemingly ignored this precedent by holding that
“Cirrus did not assume a duty to provide Flight Lesson 4a outside
of its contract with [Mr.] Prokop . . . .” 160 Cirrus undertook to train
Mr. Prokop on how to fly the SR22, but failed to provide all of the
training that it promised. 161 This breach reputedly resulted in
appellants’ death, 162 which is the most severe form of personal
injury. The appellants were not seeking remediation for pure
economic loss, such as damage to the airplane. Furthermore, the
case implicates all of the relevant public policy considerations that
have been used to justify the personal injury exception. Pilot and
passenger safety unquestionably outweigh any aviation marketplace
considerations. Additionally, there was a substantial disparity in
bargaining power between Cirrus and Mr. Prokop. Cirrus is a
multinational corporation with intimate knowledge of the SR22. 163
Mr. Prokop, conversely, was a relatively new pilot with no
experience using an autopilot. Lastly, contract damages are plainly
inadequate for claims involving the untimely deaths of two
husbands and fathers. Based on the foregoing, the contract should
not have been treated as a bar to appellants’ tort claims.
The supreme court’s reasoning to the contrary raises
significant questions for the future of tort law in Minnesota.
Minnesota courts have consistently held that a party can assume a
duty in tort even where “there [was] no duty in the first instance.”164
The existence of a contract should not alter this principle when the
claim involves personal injury. As Justice Paul Anderson argued in
his dissent:
If the mere presence of a contract foreclosed all tort
liability, medical malpractice claims would cease to exist.

158. See supra notes 46–63 and accompanying text.
159. Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 589 (Minn. 2012)
(Anderson, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 584 (majority opinion).
161. Id. at 577–78.
162. Gartland Complaint, supra note 107, ¶¶ 3–10; Glorvigen Complaint,
supra note 107, ¶¶ 19–20.
163. As the manufacturer, Cirrus was unquestionably in a better position to
foresee the potential dangers and risks of operating the SR22.
164. Williams v. Harris, 518 N.W.2d 864, 868 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); see, e.g.,
Isler v. Burman, 305 Minn. 288, 295, 232 N.W.2d 818, 821–22 (1975).
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A passenger injured in a car accident while riding in a taxi
cab would have only a breach of contract claim against the
cab driver and cab company. A paid babysitter who failed
to prevent injury to a child would be liable only in
contract. The list goes on. 165
Although Justice Anderson’s examples are extreme, he makes
a cogent point. A defendant should not be “‘immunize[d] . . . from
tort liability for his wrongful acts,’ just because those acts ‘grow out
of’ or are ‘coincident’ to a contract.” 166 Yet by rejecting that Cirrus
assumed a duty to train because of the contract, the court appears,
whether intentionally or not, to have adopted this position.
C.

An Alternative Approach: The Educational Malpractice Doctrine

To avoid this inconsistent result, the court could have, and
should have, employed the educational malpractice doctrine. The
facts were well suited for the application of this legal theory.
Training is a form of education. If there is no duty to effectively
educate, 167 then it follows that there should be no duty to effectively
train. As the court of appeals noted, assessing the effectiveness of
the transition-training program “would involve an inquiry into the
nuances of the educational process, which is exactly the type of
determination that the educational-malpractice bar is meant to
avoid.” 168
Further, the facts of Glorvigen trigger most of the relevant
public policy concerns described in Alsides. 169 Causation, for
example, is speculative at best. Because the recovery maneuver was
taught during a ground lesson, 170 it is impossible to say whether
additional in-flight instruction would have prevented the crash.
Other factors also potentially played a role in the accident,
including Mr. Prokop’s aptitude for flying and the turbulence.
Allowance of a claim in this instance would make the Minnesota
court system an overseer of flight training schools. Experts within
the industry and field, not the judiciary, should make decisions

165. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 589 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
166. Id. (quoting Eads v. Marks, 249 P.2d 257, 260 (Cal. 1952)).
167. See Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 796 N.W.2d 541, 556 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2011) (citing Alsides v. Brown Inst., Ltd., 592 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1999)), aff’d, 816 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 2012).
168. Id. (citing Alsides, 592 N.W.2d at 473–74).
169. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
170. Glorvigen, 816 N.W.2d at 577.
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regarding curriculum and methods. Lastly, the flood of litigation
resulting from a claim of this nature would be vast. Any recipient of
training in any field thereafter injured would include, as a matter
of course, a claim for educational malpractice. The door would also
potentially be open to third-party claims. 171 Would an injured
passenger have a cause of action against the pilot’s flight school for
deficient training? Would a car crash victim have a claim against a
driving school? Would an injured patient be able to sue a medical
school or an aggrieved client a law school? The examples are
almost endless.
On top of this, there is precedent from other jurisdictions to
support the application of the educational malpractice doctrine to
flight training. In Dallas Airmotive, Inc. v. FlightSafety International,
Inc., for example, a Missouri pilot was killed in a crash shortly after
completing a training program offered by the defendant. 172 It was
alleged that the defendant negligently caused the crash because its
flight simulator was “unrealistic” and its “curriculum inadequately
prepared the pilot” for flight. 173 Invoking the educational
malpractice doctrine, the court held that the plaintiff’s claim was
not cognizable because it “attack[ed] the quality of the
instruction.” 174 In particular, the court noted that the claim
implicated all of “the public policy reasons underlying the refusal
to recognize a claim of educational malpractice,” including the
speculativeness of causation and the preference for “schools, and
their regulating, accrediting, and certifying agencies, not courts . . .
to make curriculum decisions.” 175
In Waugh v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 176 the Illinois Appellate
Court reached a similar conclusion on similar facts. 177 There, the
court held that neither a flight school nor an individual instructor
could be held liable in tort where the gravamen of a wrongful
171. Third party educational malpractice claims have been attempted and
rejected in several other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Moss Rehab v. White, 692 A.2d 902,
909 (Del. 1997) (“A third-party claim for educational malpractice against a driving
school is not a cognizable common-law cause of action in Delaware.”); Moore v.
Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108, 114–15 (Iowa 1986) (holding that an injured patient
could not maintain a cause of action against her doctor’s chiropractic college for
educational malpractice).
172. 277 S.W.3d 696, 698 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008).
173. Id. at 700–01 (quotation marks omitted).
174. Id. at 701.
175. Id.
176. 966 N.E.2d 540 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
177. Id. at 543–47.
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death claim related to the “poor quality of the education or
training.” 178 The court concluded that claims attacking the quality
of flight instruction “are claims of educational malpractice and are
barred, therefore, as a matter of law.” 179
Utilizing the educational malpractice doctrine in Glorvigen
would have achieved two important ends. First, the court could
have avoided bringing into question the personal injury exception
to the economic loss doctrine. The existence of a contract should
not be treated as a shield to tort liability, particularly for claims
involving personal injury. Second, the court could have definitively
established that the educational malpractice doctrine is the law in
Minnesota, providing clarity for future cases.
D. Counterarguments to the Educational Malpractice Doctrine
There are three main counterarguments to rebut the
application of the educational malpractice doctrine in Glorvigen:
(1) appellants’ claims did not actually challenge the quality of
flight training but rather that a promised in-flight lesson was
omitted, 180 (2) Cirrus and UNDAF are not educational institutions
and therefore their conduct does not fall within the purview of the
doctrine, 181 and (3) use of the doctrine in this context would
insulate flight schools and other training programs from liability
for negligent or wrongful conduct. 182 These arguments, although
facially persuasive, ultimately lack merit.
First, as the court of appeals pointed out in Alsides, a claim for
educational malpractice arises “[w]here the essence of the
complaint is that the school failed to provide an effective
education.” 183 No matter how the appellants’ claims are packaged,
their essence is that Mr. Prokop was inadequately trained to handle
IMC-like conditions. Whether this was the result of an omitted
lesson or deficient training is of little consequence, as either would
require the court to assess the quality of the ground lesson that Mr.
Prokop did receive, and to evaluate the reason for and the impact

178. Id. at 554.
179. Id.
180. See infra notes 183–188
181. See infra notes 189–190
182. See infra notes 191–194
183. Alsides v. Brown Inst.,
(quotation marks omitted).
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of the “instructor’s failure to provide flight training.” 184 This clearly
sounds in educational malpractice.
Furthermore, it is a fairly well-established principle that items
listed in a curriculum or checklist do not automatically establish a
standard of care in tort. 185 In Larson v. Independent School District
No. 314, Braham, 186 for example, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that a school district’s curriculum, although relevant did not
create “mandatory affirmative duties for teachers, principals, or
superintendents.”187 In Canada v. McCarthy, the court similarly held
that a contractor’s safety checklist did not “establish a standard of
care,” even though all of the items in the checklist were agreed
upon ahead of time by both parties. 188 These holdings illustrate that
Cirrus’s failure to deliver Flight Lesson 4a was not, on its own, the
breach of a duty of care owed to the appellants.
Next, the fact that neither Cirrus nor UNDAF are educational
institutions does not take the case out of the scope of the
educational malpractice doctrine. Courts from other jurisdictions
have consistently held that the doctrine extends to any institution
that “assume[s] educational responsibilities,” regardless of the
context or setting. 189 Here, both Cirrus and UNDAF assumed
educational responsibilities by undertaking to provide transition
training to Mr. Prokop. Even though Cirrus is an airplane
manufacturer, the appellants’ claims require “an inappropriate
review of educational policy and procedures.” 190
Finally, the assertion that the educational malpractice doctrine
would insulate flight schools and other training programs from
liability for negligent and wrongful conduct is unfounded. First, the

184. Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 796 N.W.2d 541, 553 (Minn. Ct. App.
2011), aff’d, 816 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 2012).
185. See infra notes 186–188 and accompanying text.
186. 289 N.W.2d 112 (Minn. 1979).
187. Id. at 117 n.8.
188. 567 N.W.2d 496, 504 (Minn. 1997); see also Mervin v. Magney Constr. Co.,
416 N.W.2d 121, 125 (Minn. 1987) (“This court has consistently held that the
standard of care owed to others by a contracting party is not fixed by the terms of
the contract.”).
189. Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 687 A.2d 111, 118 (Conn. 1996);
see, e.g., Waugh v. Morgan Stanley and Co., 966 N.E.2d 540 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012);
Dall. Airmotive, Inc. v. FlightSafety Int’l, Inc., 277 S.W.3d 696 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008);
see also Glorvigen, 796 N.W.2d at 554 (noting that the educational malpractice bar
can apply to parties that are “not primarily in the business of education”).
190. Glorvigen, 796 N.W.2d at 554 (quoting Alsides v. Brown Inst., Ltd.,
592 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999)).
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doctrine does not prohibit claims for injuries occurring during the
course of instruction. Training programs and instructors, like
traditional schools and teachers, still have a duty to exercise
reasonable care to prevent injuries to students. 191 Second, a student
would still be allowed to bring an action “for breach of contract,
fraud, or misrepresentation, if it is alleged that the institution failed
to perform on specific promises,” such as “the failure to offer
classes in a particular subject or to provide a promised number of
hours of instruction.” 192 The educational malpractice doctrine does
not apply to such claims because “the essence of the plaintiff’s
complaint would not be that the institution failed to perform
adequately a promised educational service, but rather that it failed
to perform that service at all.” 193 Lastly, ineffective training schools
would undoubtedly be subjected to marketplace penalties, even
without corresponding civil liability. If a training school offered
deficient programming and employed incompetent teachers, it
would struggle to satisfy accreditation requirements. 194 Likewise,
members of the public would not attend a training school that
offered subpar instruction.
Overall, the educational malpractice doctrine is a viable
alternative that the court should have considered in Glorvigen.
While the doctrine is not without its criticisms, its application to the
191. See, e.g., Tiemann v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 740, 331 N.W.2d 250, 251
(Minn. 1983); Raleigh v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 275 N.W.2d 572, 575 (Minn.
1978); Kingsley v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 312 Minn. 572, 574, 251 N.W.2d 634,
635 (1977); Sheehan v. St. Peter’s Catholic Sch., 291 Minn. 1, 3, 188 N.W.2d 868,
870 (1971).
192. Alsides, 592 N.W.2d at 472–73.
193. Id. at 473 (quoting Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 417 (7th Cir.
1992)). Other jurisdictions that have adopted the educational malpractice
doctrine have permitted these types of claims. See, e.g., CenCor, Inc. v. Tolman,
868 P.2d 396, 400 (Colo. 1994) (holding that a school that “obligated itself to
provide modern equipment in good working condition, qualified instructors, and
computer training for all students, but did not fulfill those obligations” could be
sued for breach of contract because such a claim was not necessarily one of
educational malpractice); Ryan v. Univ. of N.C. Hosp., 494 S.E.2d 789, 791
(N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (allowing the plaintiff to bring a breach of contract claim
against a medical school for failing to offer a gynecological rotation on grounds
that the claim “would not require an inquiry into the nuances of educational
process and theories” (quoting Ross, 957 F.2d at 417)); Malone v. Acad. of Court
Reporting, 582 N.E.2d 54, 58–59 (Ohio 1990) (holding that a school’s failure to
maintain accreditation for paralegal program sounded in fraud, misrepresentation
and breach of contract, and not educational malpractice).
194. For FAA flight school and flight instructor certification and licensure
requirements, see 14 C.F.R. § 61 (2013).
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facts of the case would have been substantially more consistent with
Minnesota precedent than the court’s actual holding.
V. CONCLUSION
In Glorvigen, the Minnesota Supreme Court was confronted
with the question of whether an airplane manufacturer, Cirrus,
breached a duty in tort by failing to provide adequate training for
the safe use of its product. 195 In answering this question, the court
properly concluded that the duty to warn does not include the duty
to train. However, as this case note argues, the court employed
inconsistent reasoning in determining that Cirrus did not
voluntarily assume a duty to train. The court resolved the assumedduty issue by concluding that the breach of a contract duty cannot
create liability in tort. This reasoning contradicts settled precedent
concerning the economic loss doctrine. 196 To avoid this result, the
court should have concluded that the appellants’ claims were
barred by the educational malpractice doctrine. By not reaching
the issue of educational malpractice, the court missed an
opportunity to definitively hold that there is no duty to effectively
educate in Minnesota. In its place, the court created new precedent
that may allow manufacturers of dangerous products to avoid
liability in tort for personal injury simply by virtue of a contract.

195.
196.

Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 574 (Minn. 2012).
See supra notes 46–63 and accompanying text.
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